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"The power to create states belongs to the people who inhabit them,"
Senator Lewis Cass observed in the debate on Californian statehood
in 1850, but "the power to admit them into the Union belongs to
Congress."1 Article IV of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power to admit new states to the Union. However
Congress is not compelled to admit any incorporated territory, even
if the territory should fulfil the so-called traditional requirements for
statehood. These demand that the proposed new state has sufficient
resources and population to support state government and the cost
of Federal government; that the inhabitants of the proposed state
be sympathetic to the principles of American democracy; and that
a majority of the territorial electorate desire immediate statehood.2
Yet few territories were admitted to statehood immediately upon
fulfilling these criteria for entry. Most confronted considerable
politically-motivated or sectionally-based opposition in Congress to
their statehood objectives. Of the thirty-seven states admitted to the
Union since 1789, however, the question of statehood for the non-
contiguous but constitutionally incorporated territory of Hawaii was
more thoroughly studied and subject to more protracted opposition
than any statehood proposal ever presented to Congress.
Hawaii retained territorial status for longer than any incorporated
territory except New Mexico, which was subject to this form of
government for one year longer than Hawaii. The record of testimony
and information established through thirty-four Congressional
hearings and reports, and forty days of intermittent debate in
Congress on Hawaii3 was more voluminous and complete than for
any other territory.4 Commencing in 1903 the Hawaiian legislature
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frequently petitioned Congress for statehood. Admission bills were
constantly introduced into Congress after 1919 by Hawaii's non-
voting Delegates in the House of Representatives. In 1935, partly as
a response to threatened discrimination by Congress against the
local sugar industry, Hawaii began a forceful, organised and
expensive campaign for political equality with the existing states.5
A plebiscite conducted in 1940 indicated that more than two-thirds
of the territorial electorate favored statehood.6 All Gallup Polls
conducted in the United States after 1945 revealed that a substantial
majority consistently favored Hawaii's immediate admission.7 Before
the outbreak of World War II a House investigating committee
concluded that "Hawaii has fulfilled every [statehood] requirement
heretofore exacted of Territories".8 After the war statehood was
endorsed by both major national political parties, recommended by
Truman and Eisenhower,9 and supported by an overwhelming
majority of national newspapers.10 Moreover, as Donald Dedmon
has concluded, in the protracted Congressional debates on the issue,
"the affirmative side always had the stronger case."11 Yet Congress
refused to grant Hawaii equal status in the Union until 1959.
The Organic Act passed by Congress in 1900 granted Hawaii the
legal right to eventual statehood. It incorporated the new territory
into the Union in accordance with provisions previously applied to
incorporated territories under the Northwest Ordinance, by declaring:
That the Constitution, and, except as herein otherwise provided, all laws of the
United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and
effect within the said Territory as elsewhere in the United States.
Implicit in this clause was an assurance of ultimate statehood, as a
variety of Supreme Court decisions subsequently acknowledged that
the qualified political status of an incorporated territory was an
intermediary step to eventual statehood.12 No subsequent Con-
gressional investigating committee ever contested Hawaii's legal
entitlement to statehood.
Shortly after World War II Hawaii again initiated a vigorous
campaign for prompt admission. A majority of Hawaii's residents
endorsed immediate statehood. Perhaps more important, after
almost half a century of economic, social and political development
under territorial pupilage, the islands were fully qualified for admis-
sion and capable of supporting state government. By 1945-46 the
value of real property and goods produced in the islands exceeded
that of any territory at the time of admission, except Oklohoma,
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and was valued above that of at least ten existing states. It consistently
paid more in taxes to the Federal Treasury than it received in
Federal appropriations. Closely integrated with the national
economy, Hawaii's economy was self-sustaining and stable, despite
its lack of a diversified base. Hawaii was also an important factor in
the national economy. The value of commerce between Hawaii and
continental United States exceeded the value of trade between the
United States and all but five countries. Moreover, Hawaii paid
more in Federal taxes annually than fourteen of the states.13 It was
thus fully capable of supporting the cost of state government.
The composition and structure of Hawaii's population was unlike
that of any previous territory, but it clearly met the requirements
for statehood. In 1945 its population was larger than that of any
territory at the time of admission, except Oklahoma. Significantly,
this population had demonstrated that it met perhaps the most
important criteria for statehood—it was imbued with and sympa-
thetic towards the principles of democracy as exemplified in the
American form of government. Democratic municipal and territorial
government had been maintained in the territory after annexation,
except for the years 1941-1945 when martial law was imposed on
the territory. Moreover the absence of war-time sabotage, and the
important role of Hawaii-born combat troops during World War
II, conclusively demonstrated the loyalty of Hawaii's people and
provided substantial evidence of their successful assimilation and
Americanization.14
This high degree of assimilation was conditioned by more than
fifty years of gradual social change in the unique Hawaiian com-
munity. By 1945 over eighty-five percent of Hawaii's people were
born either in Hawaii or continental United States. Caucasians
comprised approximately thirty-four percent of the population; the
Japanese ethnic group comprised approximately thirty-two percent.
The remainder of the population was largely of Hawaiian, Filipino
or Chinese ancestry.15 Despite these diverse cultural and ethnic
backgrounds, descendants of non-Caucasian immigrants effected a
remarkable degree of social integration and adjustment to American
life. No criterion is adequate as an index of the decline of ethnic-
group consciousness of an individual in society. Nonetheless, as
sociologist Andrew Lind has observed, "perhaps the ultimate criterion
of intimacy in interethnic relations, at least under American rules
of the game, is marriage."16 From 1912 to 1945 the proportion of
interracial marriages in Hawaii increased from fourteen percent to
almost forty percent of all marriages.17 Other indices support the
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view that enthnocentricism and racial consciousness had substantially
declined by 1946. After 1931 all major ethnic groups were re-
presented in the territorial legislature, and bloc voting along ethnic
lines was not a serious problem.18 In contrast to many Southern
mainland states, no laws in Hawaii promoted racial segregation or
discrimination. The Christian Science Monitor observed in 1946:
"There is less racial friction and discrimination in Hawaii than in
many mainland areas."19 The degree of assimilation of various
ethnic groups and different generations within each group was not
uniform. It depended largely on length of residence in the islands,
economic and social status in the community, and educational oppor-
tunities and attainments. Nonetheless, as Hawaii's war experience
demonstrated, all ethnic groups shared to a large degree the attitudes
and ideals of their fellow Americans both in Hawaii and the United
States generally.
More than eighty-five percent of Hawaii's 500,000 people were
United States citizens by 1945.20 Under territorial government, how-
ever, these citizens were denied full citizenship rights, most notably
the right to elect a territorial governor, participate in Presidential
elections, or send a voting delegation to the United States Congress.
Despite this, all territorial residents were subject to Federal laws on
taxation and military service. Increasingly, local support for im-
mediate admission was motivated by a desire to gain political
representation in national decision making and self government for
the territory. Perhaps the best expression of this desire was the
ratification of a proposed Hawaii State Constitution by an over-
whelming majority of the territorial electorate in 1950.21 Post-war
Hawaii unquestionably desired statehood and was fully qualified for
it.
Fulfilment of the traditional criteria for statehood was a necessary
precondition for admission, but it was not sufficient to ensure prompt
or favorable action by Congress. The influence of a combination of
sectional and states' rights considerations often largely determined
the specific timing of admission of various territories granted state-
hood after 1789. It is suffice to cite the sectional division in Congress
over the admission of "free" or "slave" states in the four decades
prior to the Civil War, to indicate the importance of these influences.
As statehood for Hawaii was an integral factor in the bitter post-war
Congressional dispute over civil rights questions, the timing of its
admission was also determined largely by a combination of sectional
and states' rights considerations. During the protracted Congressional
debate on Hawaiian statehood from 1947 to 1959 the decisive role
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of these considerations in delaying Hawaii's admission to the Union
was manifest.
Truman appointed a special Civil Rights Commission in 1946.
It subsequently recommended that Congress enact substantive civil
rights legislation to ensure the equal political rights of minorities,
especially Negroes. In his State of the Union message of January
1948 Truman defined a new policy aimed at eliminating political
or economic discrimination based on "race, or creed, or color, or
land, or origin."22 In the following months he defined a ten-point
program which provided for a Civil Rights Commission, anti-
lynching laws, abolition of the poll-tax and the protection of voting
rights for all citizens. Implementation of this comprehensive civil
rights program, Truman emphasised, demanded not only the
granting of full citizenship rights to minority groups in existing states,
but immediate statehood for Hawaii. Statehood was essential if all
United States citizens were to enjoy full and equal civil rights.23 Yet
even if Truman had not explicitly classified statehood for Hawaii as
an aspect of his civil rights program, the two issues would nonetheless
have become fused when considered by Congress. Indeed, the
developing relationship between the issues was evidenced during
Congressional debate on Hawaii prior to Truman's call for passage
of comprehensive civil rights legislation in 1948.
On June 30, 1947 the House of Representatives voted for the first
time on statehood for Hawaii. The legislation passed by a vote of
196 to 133. Only fifty-six Republicans opposed statehood; 141 sup-
ported it. In contrast, only fifty-five Democrats voted affirmatively,
while seventy-seven voted negatively. Despite endorsement by the
Democratic Administration, a majority of Democrats who voted
opposed Hawaii's admission, and a majority of Republicans sup-
ported it. Opposition derived almost exclusively from the eleven
Southern states, the "border" states of Missouri and Maryland, and
some large Northern states, notably Pennsylvania, New York,
Illinois and New Jersey. Most of the ninety-four Representatives who
abstained from voting represented large Northern states. However
a majority in only one Northern state—Pennsylvania—voted against
admission. In contrast, four former Confederate states—Alabama,
Arkansas, Virginia and Texas—voted unanimously against state-
hood. A majority of Representatives from the Southern states of
Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and the "border" states of Missouri and Maryland, voted negatively.
The eleven Southern states provided only fifteen affirmative votes
and sixty-three opposition votes. All but two Southern opponents
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were Democrats.24 Given this voting pattern, the Honolulu Star
Bulletin's suggestion that the vote did not reflect "partisan or
sectional" interests,25 was clearly inaccurate.
The voting alignments reflected the influence of important political
and sectional factors which subsequently had a decisive impact on
Hawaii's attempt to gain statehood. Majority Republican support
and majority Democratic opposition resulted in part from partisan
political considerations. Hawaii was traditionally a Republican
territory.26 Republicans anticipated that Hawaii statehood would
increase the Republican majority in the Senate. Some Democrats
opposed admission because they anticipated that it would reduce
their party's prospect of regaining control of the Senate. Moreover,
a number of Democrats wanted to delay action on Hawaii until
Alaska could be admitted simultaneously. Alaska was traditionally
a strong Democratic territory.27 Thus some Democrats who sup-
ported Hawaii, favored concurrent admission of both territories. Yet
the influence of partisan political factors should not be overestimated.
Although Republican support for Hawaii was stronger than Demo-
cratic support, the vote nonetheless indicated considerable bipartisan
support for Hawaii.
Related sectional and racial factors, rather than political con-
siderations, were the major determinants of the voting pattern on
the statehood bill. Strongest opposition derived from the most
populous states and the Southern states, and was motivated by a
desire to preserve existing state representation in Congress, especially
the Senate. The admission of Hawaii with a comparatively small
population had profound implications for existing states, as it
threatened to reduce their voting strength in Congress. Representa-
tive Coudert (N.Y.) protested that the Hawaii bill would in effect
grant Hawaii one Senator for every 35,000 voters. In contrast, in
New York state, one Senator represented 2,500,000 citizens.28
Southern opposition to Hawaii's admission was compounded by an
overriding concern that Representatives and Senators elected by
Hawaii would actively promote civil rights legislation in Congress.
Larcade (La.), one of the few Southern Democratic proponents of
statehood for Hawaii, acknowledged the influence of this factor when
he declared:
. . . my people, the South, and myself have definite opinions in regard to the
racial question; however on my visit to Hawaii I observed men and women of
all races intermingling and assimilating in perfect harmony. If that is their way
of life, that is their business, and they are entitled to their way of life, In the South
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we do not approve of this way of life, and this should be our business; and like
Hawaii, all that we ask is that we be given the same privilege to make our own
determination in this respect.29
However, in contrast to Larcade, a majority of Southern Congress-
men interpreted Hawaiian statehood as a factor which might
irrevocably reduce the right of Southern states to determine domestic
racial policies and practice by adding voting strength to the growing
"liberal", anti-segregationist bloc in the Senate. Thus, to a majority
of Southerners, Hawaii statehood constituted a direct threat to their
sectional interests. Their opposition to the admission of the racially
tolerant Hawaii was predicated largely on a desire to preserve their
existing states' rights by averting any dilution of the South's voting
strength in Congress. It resulted directly from the belief that
Hawaii's Senators might, as one Mississippi newspaper stated,
"hold the decisive vote on all major legislation" involving "racial
problems within the continental United States."30 Similarly, a
Texas newspaper argued that statehood would "give Hawaii the
right to exercise two Senators worth of self-determination on the
South."31
Much Southern opposition was also influenced by the belief that
Hawaii's people could not be adequately assimilated into American
society. This view was perhaps most clearly expressed by Preston
(D. Ga.) who stated in the House debate:
What does it [the Hawaii bill] do? It makes citizens with equal rights with you
and me of 180,000 Japanese. . . . It gives these people the same rights you and
I have; we the descendants of those who created, fought and maintained this
country. . . . When you give these people the same rights we have today, you
will have two Senators speaking for those 180,000 Japanese.32
Statehood supporters conceded that "the mixed racial character of
the Hawaiian population" was a "principal ground for serious op-
position," and attempted to expose it as "a dangerous form of
racism."33
Hawaii statehood "might be decided on the basis of realistic
politics, not on its merits," a Hawaiian newspaper concluded in
1947.34 An analysis of Congressional action (or non-action) on
various Hawaii statehood bills after 1947 indicates the accuracy of
this prediction. In the House, the anti-civil rights faction was seldom
able to avert passage of statehood legislation. But the Southern
Democrat-influenced House Rules Committee occasionally delayed
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or at least complicated consideration of statehood bills by combining
separate Hawaii and Alaska bills into a joint measure that was un-
acceptable to most Republicans and thus, unlike the separate
Hawaii bill, did not enjoy majority bipartisan support in either
chamber. In the Senate, the anti-civil rights faction averted affirmative
action by promoting only a combined Hawaii-Alaska measure,
delaying the reporting of bills from committee or initiating a fili-
buster as the ultimate means of averting affirmative Congressional
action. With strong support from "Old Guard" Republicans,
Southern Senators adopted a procedural strategy to defeat the
Hawaii bill which was similar to that adopted to defeat Truman's
civil rights program. In the early post-war years Senate opposition
was more united and comparatively stronger than House opposition.
Moreover, during 1947-1958 Senate opposition was the more effective
because no substantive cloture rule was passed and thus the use of
a Senate filibuster remained the decisive veto weapon for Con-
gressional opponents.
Although the House passed the Hawaii bill in the first session of
the Eightieth Congress, Senate opponents averted direct floor
consideration of it during the second session. An attempt by in-
fluential Republican Senator Knowland (California) to discharge
the bill from committee and have it debated by the Senate was
rejected by a decisive margin of fifty-one votes to twenty in 1948.
Fourteen Republicans and only six Democrats supported Knowland's
resolution. "The list of opposing Republicans," one commentator
observed, "reads like a roll-call of the Old Guard."35 With only three
exceptions, all Democrats who opposed the motion represented
former Confederate states.36
Congressional action on statehood legislation during 1947-1948
closely paralleled action on civil rights generally. Although some
aspects of Truman's program passed the House, no part of it gained
Senate approval. A coalition of conservative Republicans and
Southern Democrats combined to defeat this legislation or avert floor
consideration of it. Moreover, civil rights supporters failed to estab-
lish an effective cloture rule which theoretically would have provided
a means of thwarting Southern-led filibusters and threats to filibuster
against civil rights and statehood legislation.37 Thus, although the
numerical strength of the anti-civil rights, anti-statehood faction in
the Senate was gradually eroded after 1947, use or threat of a
filibuster by this faction remained effective in averting affirmative
Senate action during 1949-1956.
House debate on Hawaii was averted during 1949 by the refusal
of the conservative House Rules Committee to schedule the bill for
floor debate.38 However, in January 1950 a move to discharge the
committee from further consideration of the bill was carried by the
House.39 Democratic and Republican leaders agreed to debate
Alaska immediately before Hawaii.40 On March 3, 1950 the House,
by a vote of 186 to 146, approved Alaskan statehood for the first
time.41 On March 7 the House again approved statehood for Hawaii.
Support for Hawaii was much stronger than for Alaska, and signi-
ficantly stronger than in 1947. The House approved the Hawaii
bill in 1950 by a decisive 262 votes to n o . Opposition was restricted
almost exclusively to a small minority of large-state Republicans and
a substantial majority of Democrats from all Southern states except
Florida and Louisiana.42
The Democratic Senate leadership refused to schedule debate on
statehood legislation prior to adjournment for the 1950 elections
because of opposition from Southern Democrats to the legislation.43
In the brief "lame-duck" session after the November elections
Truman requested that the Senate immediately admit both Hawaii
and Alaska. On November 28 the Senate began intermittent debate
on Alaska.44 Opposition to this bill was led by Southern Democrats
Eastland (Miss.), Stennis (Miss.), Russell (Ga.), and the leading
Republican opponent of statehood, Butler (Neb.). On December 4,
Majority Leader Lucas acknowledged that opponents were prepared
to filibuster to defeat statehood legislation, and deferred considera-
tion of either statehood bill during 1950.45 O'Mahoney (D. Wyo.)
correctly alleged that the Southern-led resistance "constituted a
full-scale filibuster" on the statehood issue.46
Attempts to promote statehood during the Eighty-second Congress
focused largely on the Senate, as proponents accepted that favorable
House action would again prove futile unless preceded by an
affirmative Senate vote. However the results of the 1950 elections
substantially reduced the prospects of favorable action during 1951-
52. Although the Democrats maintained majorities in both chambers
of Congress, their Senate majority was reduced to only two seats.47
This development confirmed the determination of the Democratic
Party to retain its slight Senate majority by refusing to promote
statehood for Hawaii without prior approval of Alaskan legislation.
Thus the partisan political implications of the statehood issue
acquired new significance after 1950.
Threats of a filibuster averted Senate debate on either statehood
bill during 1951. However in February 1952 the Alaska bill was
again debated bv the Senate. It retained priority ahead of Hawaii
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because the Truman Administration refused to permit consideration
of "Republican" Hawaii ahead of "Democratic" Alaska.48 "After a
spirited debate which consumed the greater part of eleven days over
a period of four weeks," the Senate voted to recommit the Alaska
bill to committee for further investigation.49 This action was tanta-
mount to the defeat of both Alaska and Hawaii in the Eighty-second
Congress.
The recommittal motion passed by a narrow one vote margin, 45
to 44, on February 27, 1952. Twenty-five Democrats, nineteen of
whom represented Southern states, and twenty Republicans, in-
cluding such conservatives as Taft (Ohio), Bridges (N.H.), and
Butler, voted for recommittal, and thus against statehood. Twenty-
four Democrats and twenty Republicans opposed recommittal.50
Southern opponents "lobbied desperately" to gain support for re-
committal by offering to support particular legislation favored by
various Senators as the quid pro-quo for support for the recommittal
motion.51
Republican-sponsored attempts to bring the Hawaii bill to the
floor after recommittal of Alaska failed. On March 3, 1952, the
Senate voted forty-seven to thirty-two to defer consideration of the
Hawaii measure. In contrast to the previous Senate vote on Alaska,
Hawaii did not receive strong bipartisan support. Only six Demo-
crats and twenty-six Republicans favored consideration of the
separate Hawaii bill.52 Many Democrats withdrew their support of
Hawaii because the Alaska measure had previously been defeated.
In the narrowly controlled Democratic Senate, defeat of Alaska
inevitably resulted in simultaneous defeat of Hawaii.
Republican victories in the House, Senate and Presidential
elections of 1952 did not help to extricate Congressional consideration
of Hawaii from the influence of partisan political factors during the
Eighty-third Congress. Rather, the policy adopted by the new
Republican Administration strengthened the negative influence of
these factors, and made the use of filibusters by the Southern faction
unnecessary.
The Republican Party retained only a one seat majority in the
Senate during 1954.53 In an attempt to increase this majority to
three, Eisenhower vigorously promoted the separate admission of
Hawaii but refused to give Alaskan statehood unequivocal endorse-
ment.54 This policy precipitated bitter party division on statehood,
which opponents of either territory effectively capitalized on.
On March 10, 1953 a separate Hawaii bill passed the House by
a vote of 274 to 138. Although the measure again enjoyed consider-
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able bipartisan support, Democratic opposition was stronger than
in 1947 or 1950.55 Moreover, the fact that Democrats did not unite
to oppose the bill reflected a belief that Alaska would be considered
by the House later in 1953. However the House Rules Committee
refused to report the Alaska bill for floor debate in 1953.
The Senate commenced consideration of the separate Hawaii bill
in March 1954. Immediately, liberal and conservative Democrats
and a small number of anti-statehood Republicans united to oppose
consideration of the separate Hawaii bill. Minority Leader Lyndon
Johnson stated that Democrats would adopt this strategy because
Eisenhower had made statehood a partisan issue by refusing to
promote Alaska.56 He emphasized that even if separate bills passed
both chambers during 1954, Eisenhower would veto Alaska and
thereby increase Republican voting strength in Congress.57 On
March 10, 1954 the Senate passed a Democratic-sponsored motion
to combine the Hawaii and Alaska bills by a narrow margin of 46
votes to 43. Support for combining the bills derived from forty-two
Democrats and only three Republicans and the independent,
Senator Morse.58 As Senator Holland had correctly predicted, "a
curious looking team . . . composed of those who are completely
against statehood aligned with those who are strongly in favor of
both territories," supported the motion.59 Statehood opponents voted
to combine the bills because they were confident it would never pass
the Senate.
The combined bill was debated intermittently in the Senate for
almost three weeks in March, 1954. Early in the debate Southern
Democrats threated to filibuster. After speaking for four hours East-
land stated on March 16 that he had barely reached the "preface"
of the remarks, and emphasized that he would take possibly four
days to complete them.60 However a protracted filibuster did not
develop. The decision of the anti-statehood faction to permit a
Senate vote resulted from a realization that a filibuster was un-
necessary. Opponents were confident the House would not pass the
combined bill. Fulbright (D. Ark.) stated prior to the Senate vote:
"We are told that definitely the House will never pass a bill granting
statehood for Alaska."61 The withdrawal of opposition to a Senate
vote possibly resulted directly from a specific Republican assurance
that the House would not consider the combined bill prior to con-
clusion of the Eighty-third Congress.62
The Senate passed the combined bill by a decisive 57 votes to 28
on April 1, 1954. Although the vote reflected the continuance of a
liberal-conservative division on statehood,63 it also indicated that
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Hawaii enjoyed majority, bipartisan support in the Senate when the
question of admission was isolated from partisan politics.
The House did not debate the combined bill during 1954. Opposi-
tion from the Republican Administration and House Democratic
leader Rayburn (Texas), an opponent of statehood for either
territory, averted the calling of a conference of senior members of
the House and Senate to resolve differences in the House and Senate
versions of statehood legislation.64 In July the House Rules Committee
voted to end consideration of the combined bill and refused to
forward it to floor of the House.65
The altered composition of Congress and the legislature of Hawaii
during 1955-1956 further aggravated the negative influence of party
politics on the statehood question, and provided conditions which
Southern opponents effectively exploited. The Democrats gained
majorities in both chambers of Congress in the 1954 elections. In
the Senate, however, they gained a majority of only one seat.66
Perhaps more significantly, the Democratic Party gained control of
the Hawaii legislature for the first time in 1954.67 Moreover, it
increased its majorities in both chambers of the Alaska legislature.68
Statehood opponents stressed the implications of these election
results for the national Republican Party: "Based on the 1954 election
returns," Representative Pillion (R.N.Y.) emphasized, "it appears
that, in the event of statehood, Alaska would surely elect 2 Demo-
cratic Senators and Hawaii would be likely to elect 2 Democratic
Senators."69 Cognizant of this possibility, Republicans were reluct-
ant to increase Democratic strength in the narrowly divided Congress
by admitting either territory during the Eighty-fourth Congress.
Increased Southern Democratic influence in Congress also de-
creased the prospects of affirmative action during 1955-1956. The
new Senate Majority Leader, Johnson, and House Speaker, Rayburn,
were both opposed to statehood for Hawaii. The new chairman of
the House Rules Committee, Smith (Va.), was an implacable
opponent of statehood.70 Moreover, statehood opponents comprised
a majority of the Rules Committee.71 As these three Southern
Democrats and the Rules Committee largely determined what
legislation Congress would or would not debate, the prospects of
favorable action on statehood were further reduced.
In April, 1955, the House Rules Committee granted a rule which
permitted House debate on a combined statehood bill, but was
unacceptable to either Republican supporters of Hawaii or Demo-
cratic supporters of both territories. One proponent described it as
"a monstrosity of a rule" designed to defeat both territories.72 The
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committee granted a "closed rule," which prohibited amendments
being made to the bill and thus precluded any attempt to debate
the separate admission of either territory. Committee opponents
correctly assumed that the combined bill would again be defeated
because of Republican opposition to Alaska.73
The House considered the combined bill briefly on May 9 and
May 10, 1955, before voting 281 to 170 to recommit it to the Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs for additional investigation.
Both parties divided over the issue, but in contrast to previous House
votes on separate Hawaii bills, Republicans offered strongest support
for recommittal and hence strongest opposition to simultaneous
admission of both territories. More than sixty percent of House
Republicans, and more than ninety percent of Democratic Represen-
tatives of the eleven Southern states, supported recommittal.74 No
further action was taken on statehood by either chamber during
1955-1956.
Although Hawaii statehood legislation passed the House three
times during 1947-1953, by the end of 1956 the Senate had never
voted on a separate Hawaii bill. The Senate had passed a joint
Hawaii—Alaska bill, but the House had never passed a combined
measure. However, during 1957—1959 a combination of factors led
to a marked breakdown of the intensity of both politically motivated
and sectional opposition to the separate admission of either territory.
In this altered Congressional environment statehood proponents
were able to gain strong bipartisan support in both chambers for a
compromise strategy which promoted the separate admissions of
both territories.
Civil rights legislation gained increasing public and Congressional
support during the 1950's. The introduction of a civil rights program
by Eisenhower in 1956 was more a response to growing demands for
such legislation than a reflection of the President's willingness to
promote progressive racial legislation.75 Increasingly, many Con-
gressmen accepted that the denial of equal rights to almost ten percent
of United States citizens was an embarrasing anomaly in a country
based ostensibly on a concept of freedom and equality for all. This
development, coupled with the growth of Republican support in
Negro districts in the 1956 elections, contributed to the emergence
of a coalition of Northern Democrats and an overwhelming majority
of moderate Republicans who endorse passage of moderate civil
rights legislation in 1957.76
Confronted with a pro-civil rights majority m the Senate, Southern
Democrats and the few Republican opponents of civil rights adopted
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a compromise procedure in Congress. Lacking sufficient votes to
defeat the civil rights program, the conservative faction attempted
to modify provisions of the legislation rather than defeat it outright.
Some civil rights opponents anticipated that initiation of a filibuster
against the legislation would strengthen the determination of liberal
Democrats to establish stronger rules against the filibuster and
possibly encourage moderate Republicans to support establishment
of an effective cloture rule. Early in 1957 the Senate again rejected
a motion to consider adoption of a strong cloture rule. The defeat of
this motion resulted largely from the opposition of a majority of
Republican Senators, many of whom favored the adoption of mild
civil rights legislation during 1957. Southern Democrats accepted
that initiation of a filibuster against civil rights legislation might
alienate many of these Republicans, and thereby increase Senate
support for cloture.77 Thus, during 1957 no filibuster was waged to
defeat the civil rights program.
The absence of a filibuster was not a reflection of general Southern
acceptance of the Eisenhower program. Rather, as Shuman has
convincingly argued, "the failure of the filibuster may be regarded
as a carefully calculated decision to avoid consequences which would
have been worse, from the Southern point of view, than those of the
bill as it passed the Senate."78 By adopting a compromise strategy,
civil rights opponents succeeded in gaining sufficient Senate support
to modify some important provisions of the 1957 bill.79 Yet as C.
Van Woodward and others have pointed out, the adoption of a
compromise strategy and a more conciliatory rhetoric by civil rights
opponents did not reflect a decline in Southern determination to
oppose external intervention in state matters. Rather, it reflected
their continued determination to resist Federal encroachments on
"the Southern way of life." The flexible strategy adopted by the
anti-civil rights faction was more a response to the exigencies of
Congressional politics than a symptom of modified attitudes of most
Southerners on racial issues.80 Nonetheless, the very fact that by
1957 the anti-civil rights faction was forced to compromise its position
on racial issues in Congress, had far reaching implications for
Hawaii statehood.
Passage of the 1957 civil rights bill was, as Shuman has em-
phasized, "the first important occasion" after 1938 when the conser-
vative coalition was defeated in Congress.81 It indicated that a new
coalition of liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans was
prepared to support moderate civil rights legislation. After 1957 this
majority coalition also gave strong support to the related civil rights
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issues of statehood for Alaska and Hawaii. The 1957 vote on civil
rights also indicated that although the admission of four new Senators
from Hawaii and Alaska might increase "liberal" strength in
Congress, these new Senators would not be decisive in determining
national policy on civil rights. The addition of "liberal" Senators
from Hawaii and Alaska was no longer viewed as a necessary
precondition for the passage of civil rights legislation. Thus, Con-
gressional opponents of civil rights were more amenable to com-
promise on the statehood issue after 1957. This is not to suggest that
strong opposition to an increase in the number of states suddenly
dissipated. Nonetheless, after 1957 states' rights opponents of state-
hood reluctantly accepted that strong conservative influence in
Congress and the Democratic Party could best be maintained by
compromise, rather than by continued intransigent opposition to
civil rights or statehood legislation. The failure of opponents to invoke
filibusters against statehood legislation after 1957, and their reluctant
acceptance of a compromise procedural strategy sponsored by
Democratic proponents to break the political stalemate on statehood,
is strong evidence of this.
No floor action was taken on statehood in either chamber of
Congress in 1957. In 1958, however, Congress took decisive action.
In January, Johnson convened a vitally important confidential con-
ference of Democratic supporters of both territories. The newly
elected Hawaii Delegate to Congress, John Burns (the first Democrat
to fill this position after World War II) and leading Senate proponents
attended.82 This group agreed to support Congressional action on
Alaska only during 1958. Liberal Democratic supporters of both
territories endorsed this arrangement in return for assurances from
Johnson and Rayburn that the Alaska bill would definitely be debated
and voted no in both chambers before the close of the Eighty-fifth
Congress.83 Burns actively supported the plan because he was con-
fident the admission of Alaska would break the political impasse in
Congress which had perennially contributed to the defeat of state-
hood for either territory.84 Following this meeting Democratic
proponents conceded that Hawaii would not be voted on in either
chamber during 1958.85
This Democratic strategy was enthusiastically accepted by vir-
tually all Democratic Congressmen who did not represent Southern
constituencies. It remained "a basic tenet of political faith on
Capitol Hill" that Alaska's admission "means two Democratic
Senators," the New York Times observed early in 1958.86 With Senate
elections due in November 1958, Democrats were aware that two
additional Democratic Senators might ensure continued Democratic
control of the Senate. Yet general Democratic acceptance of the
"Alaska only" strategy was also conditioned by a number of other
significant influences. Adoption of this strategy placated Democratic
statehood proponents who accepted that Alaska's admission in 1958
would make affirmative Congressional action on Hawaii "inevitabel"
in 1959.87 Moreover, the strategy was a compromise which minimized
sectional division within the party over the related statehood and
civil rights issues. It offered some protection for Southern interests
within the Democratic Party and Congress because it ensured that,
at most, only one "liberal" state would be admitted in 1958. Southern
acceptance of the strategy also resulted in part from a belief that
without substantial Republican support for "Democratic" Alaska,
the northern territory would not gain the requisite votes in either
chamber for admission in 1958. The anti-statehood faction possibly
miscalculated early in 1958 by assuming that the Republican Party
would continue to oppose the separate admission of Alaska. Also,
opponents possibly reasoned that in the absence of this compromise
strategy, the majority coalition of pro-statehood Democrats and
Republicans might vote to admit both territories in 1958. For
opponents the strategy was at least a certain way of delaying the
admission of multiracial Hawaii and, even better, a possible means
for again defeating both territories.
Early in 1958 Republican proponents refused to support Alaskan
statehood without an explicit assurance from Democratic leaders
that Hawaii would also be considered by both houses of Congress in
1958.88 However sustained attempts to oppose the separate Alaska
bill, or to again combine the Alaska and Hawaii bills, did not gain
majority support from Republicans. The compromise strategy adopted
by the Democratic Party confronted the Republican Party with a
major dilemma. Pro-statehood Republicans could not collaborate
with Southern Democrats to defeat the separate Alaska bill, without
simultaneously undermining subsequent bipartisan support for
Hawaii. Moreover this procedure would have suggested that the
Republican Party, not the Democrats, opposed the admission of
either territory. The Republican Party would thus have assumed
responsibility for the defeat of statehood legislation which constituted
a major portion of Eisenhower's proposed legislative program during
the Eighty-fifth Congress. The Republican Party had advocated the
immediate admission of Hawaii for a decade. In 1957 it also endorsed
the immediate admission of Alaska. Few Republicans were prepared
to accept responsibility for the defeat of statehood legislation for
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either territory in 1958. Nor could the Republican Party support
attempts to combine the Alaska and Hawaii bills without displaying
considerable hypocrisy. Prior to 1957 the Republican Party had
consistently denounced the Democratic sponsored attempts to com-
bine the statehood bills as a politically motivated maneuver designed
to defeat the admission of both territories. Thus in 1958 Democratic
proponents alleged that Republican efforts to combine the bill would
constitute a deliberate attempt to defeat statehood for both terri-
tories.89 Also, as the New fork Times remarked, the Republican
Party was reluctant to continue its "unremitting hostility" to Alaska
because this may have alienated Alaskan voters and thus further
consolidated Democratic strength in Alaska.90 Republican opposition
to Alaska may also have had adverse political repercussions for
Republican candidates in the 1958 Hawaii elections. Finally, most
Republicans supported Alaska statehood because they expected that
this action would be a tangible step to the quick admission of Hawaii.
Indeed many Republican proponents genuinely believed that they
could gain the support of liberal Democrats for the admission of
Hawaii in 1958, immediately following passage of the Alaska bill.91
By 1958 it was not politically expedient for the Republican Party to
assume responsibility for the defeat of statehood for either territory.
The separate Alaska bill passed the House by a vote of 210 to 66
on May 28, 1958. Although both parties divided over the measure,
majorities of both parties voted affirmatively.92 After almost a week
of intermittent debate, the Senate voted on the separate admission
of Alaska on June 30, 1958. The bill passed by an overwhelming 64
votes to 20. Only thirteen Democrats—twelve of whom represented
Southern states—and seven Republicans opposed Alaska's admis-
sion.93 As in previous years the conservative coalition remained
opposed to any expansion of the Union, but by 1958 this coalition
no longer commanded the support of a substantial number of Sena-
tors. Senate voting alignments on the 1957 civil rights act and the
1958 Alaska bill were very similar. With only two exceptions, all
Senators who voted for Alaska also voted for the civil rights legisla-
tion.94 Thus, in large measure, the coalition of liberal Democrats
and moderate Republicans which had endorsed the civil rights bill
was temporarily revived in 1958 to support statehood for Alaska.
The following year these factions again combined to promote the
admission of Hawaii.
By 1958, for the first time, separate statehood bills enjoyed
majority, bipartisan support in both chambers of Congress, and were
no longer threatened by the delaying tactics previously employed by
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statehood opponents. The favorable developments which expedited
passage of the Alaska bill were not reversed after 1958. The Demo-
cratic Party retained control of both Houses of Congress and Johnson
and Rayburn retained their respective positions as Senate Majority
Leader and House Speaker. They were thus able to implement the
final aspect of the compromise strategy adopted by the Democrats
in January 1958—-the admission of Hawaii early in the eighty-sixth
Congress.
On March 9, 1959, Johnson scheduled Senate consideration of
the Hawaii bill for the following day. Also, on March 10 the House
Rules Committee by seven votes to four scheduled House debate on
the Hawaii bill for March 11. This unexpected decision was partly
the product of pressure from Democratic leaders in the House and
Senate.95
"From the outset" of the debate, the New York Times observed,
"approval of statehood for Hawaii was a settled matter."96 After
less than one day of debate, on March 11, 1959, the Senate approved
the Hawaii bill by an overwhelming 76 votes to 15.97 On the same
day the House adopted by 338 votes to 69, a rule providing for
immediate consideration of the Hawaii bill. Unanimous consent was
granted on March 12 to substitute the Senate approved bill (S. 50)
for the House bill (H.R. 4221), and after six hours of debate the
vote was taken. The House approved Hawaii statehood by a margin
of 323 votes to only 89.98 Thus, "after one of the fastest actions by
Congress in years," the New Tork Times commented, "only the
mechanics of admitting a new state remain before Hawaii joins the
Union."99
The voting alignments on Hawaii conformed closely with those
on Alaska in 1958 and civil rights in 1957. Of the sixty-five Demo-
cratic Representatives who voted negatively in the House, only two
did not represent former Confederate states. Five large Northern
states—Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania—
provided seventeen of the twenty-four negative Republican votes.100
The fifteen negative Senate votes were cast by fourteen Southern
Democrats and one Republican.101 All but one of the fourteen
Southern Senators who voted against Hawaii also voted with the
eighteen opponents of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Eleven of these
fourteen Senators also voted against the Alaska bill in 1958.102
Acceptance of the insular territory of Hawaii as a state in 1959
was an unprecedented development in United States history. It
irrevocably extended the boundaries of the United States beyond
their traditional continental limits. It also incorporated permanently
into the Union a state with a population of predominantly Asiatic
extraction. Yet the unique geographical location of Hawaii and the
composition of its population per se were not the major obstacles to
statehood. Resistance to admission of Hawaii was motivated largely
by the determination of the anti-civil rights faction to maintain the
sectional and political status-quo in Congress, and to thereby preserve
the existing influence of their particular states and geographic
section on national decision making. This faction perennially em-
ployed complex procedural strategies in Congressional committees
and on the floor of the Senate to delay or defeat the admission of
Hawaii, primarily because the admission of Senators from the
tolerant, multiracial islands threatened to undermine the ability of
this faction to avert passage of civil rights and related legislation by
Congress. The effectiveness of these strategies was compounded by
the impact of the Alaskan statehood issue and the determination of
groups within both major parties to reap political advantage by
promoting the separate admission of only one territory. Nonetheless,
the relationship of statehood to the divisive civil rights issue was the
basic reason for the prolonged post-war delay by Congress over the
admission of Hawaii. National debates over the admission of such
territories as Missouri and Maine, Kansas and Nebraska, or Cali-
fornia, were perhaps more bitter but less protracted than debate on
Hawaii's admission. With the important exception of the bitter
sectional resistance manifest against the admission of "free" or
"slave" territories from the time of the Missouri Compromise of
1821 to the outbreak of the Civil War, no territory confronted more
vigorous or determined sectionally based opposition to its appeals
for admission than Hawaii.
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